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RECENT BOOKS

BOOK REVIEW
By Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong. New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1979. Pp. 467 (including index). $13.95.
THE BRETHREN.

Reviewed by FernandN. Dutile*
Because of the substantial media attention accompanying the publication
of The Brethren, one approaches the book with a feeling of ambivalence. Fortunately, the sensationalism highlighted by the media constitutes a relatively
small part of the book and detracts from what is in many respects a valuable
treatment of the Supreme Court's decision-making process.
Part of the reader's ambivalence likely stems from doubt about the book's
credibility. According to Woodward and Armstrong, their sources included
several Justices, more than one hundred and seventy former law clerks, and
other former employees of the Court.' Furthermore, the authors claim access
to "unpublished material" that provides the "core documentation.' '2 (Woodward and Armstrong's claim that Chief Justice Burger in no way cooperated
with the venture is evident from even a cursory inspection of the book.)
Specificity, an index of reliability the authors ignore, is a criterion of
which the Court itself approves. Discussing the reliability of an informer's tip,
Justice Harlan once observed that the detail provided by an informant can provide a suitable measure of reliability. Justice Harlan concluded that a
"magistrate, when confronted with [substantial] detail could reasonably infer
that the informant [has] gained his information in a reliable way." '3 The
specificity in The Brethren, including quotes from private conversations and internal memoranda, is dazzling. Thus, specificity, the Court's own index of
reliability, gives dramatic support to the credibility of much of The Brethren.
The book is perhaps least credible, however, when purporting to describe
the thought processes of various individuals. For example, the book alleges that
during the Nixon tapes controversy:
Burger knew that he faced a tough choice. There was no "give" in Stewart's
posture, and Stewart seemed to have lined up all the others. Burger read
through the alternative drafts. They were really two different ways of saying
the same thing .... Burger was sure his version was better, but the others
thought differently .... What was the big deal? .. .Did the difference have
any substance? Burger could find none. It would all seem silly in a few weeks.
. . . The 4main thing was to get the opinion delivered. He wanted it
unanimous.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School and Member of the Maine Bar; A.B., Assumption College, 1962; J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 1965.
1 B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 3 (1979).
2 Id. at4.
3 Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1969).
4 B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note I, at 341.
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As with many similar passages' in the book, the reader is led to believe he is
privy to the actual thought processes of the principal. Such a device lends an
unjustified authenticity to the passage. Actually, the reader is getting a
Justice's recollection of what he thought or, more likely, others' recollections of
what he thought. Because the specific sources for the particular thought process
passages are not disclosed, the reliability of such passages is doubtful at best.
The Brethren also creates a fair amount of ambivalence in the reader
because of the alleged perfidy of those clerks "leaking" to the authors information on the workings of the Court. Although there were doubtless serious violations of professional confidentiality, several points must be borne in mind.
First, the confidentiality involved was not one specifically protected by the
Code of Professional Responsibility whose mandates refer only to the lawyerclient context. This is not to say, however, that there is no professional confidentiality between a Justice and his clerk. A professional expectation of confidence could arise in either of two ways. First, absent matters of conscience, a
clerk should consider himself bound not to reveal what the clerk-Justice relationship impliedly makes confidential. Confidentiality is a prerequisite to
allowing a Justice to work out his views in hard debate with his clerk without
fearing that the Justice's tentative judgments will appear in the evening
newspaper. Second, a Justice and his clerk should be free to agree, again absent issues of conscience, that matters relating to their professional performance shall be confidential as long as the agreement is not otherwise overbearing or unconscionable. Further agreements would depend on the "ethics of
friendship" rather than on any professional ethical requirement. In short,
there are some things a good friend would not reveal regardless of any professional expectation of confidentiality. Thus, the material which has caused the
greatest turmoil may well be the least "protected" under any reasonable expectation of professional confidentiality. Ironically, the most legitimately confidential materials "leaked" by the clerks, the memoranda and conversations
concerning the issues involved in actual cases, have created the least controversy. On the other hand, a Justice presumably is free to discuss many things his
clerk should refuse to disclose. Certainly a Justice is free to discuss his own
views on issues. His relationship with the Court, however, might create a
reasonable expectation of confidentiality with regard to, for example, discussion of pending cases at conference and elsewhere. Also, although an individual Justice might relieve his own clerks of the requirements of confidentiality concerning the Justice's views on certain issues not before the Court,
certain confidentiality would be beyond an individual Justice's capacity to
waive. For example, one Justice could not unilaterally waive the confidentiality
of a private discussion with otherJustices on cases before the Court or the votes
of individual Justices at conference.
Whether or not they are reliable or composed from information which was
ethically revealed, the portrayals in the book are, if not sensational, the stuff of
novels and movies. Consider the following partial cast of characters:
CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN BURGER
Formal to the point of comedy, it is Burger who sends a memo to the clerks
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reminding them to wear jackets in the Court's halls. It is Burger who worries
until the last minute that Justice Harlan would, in announcing the opinion of
the Court in a free speech case, use the offending word itself from the bench.
Indeed, Burger is alleged to have told Harlan that use of the word " 'would be
the end of the Court.'
The book's rendition ofJustice Burger is the harshest. Burger is pictured
as intellectually dishonest, shifting positions and votes so as to be able to assign
the opinions, insensitive to in forma pauperis petitions, sometimes ignorant of
basic constitutional law, belligerent, political and vain. At one point Burger
wanted to turn the conference room into his ceremonial office for greeting
dignitaries such as foreign heads of state. The book reports that although he
was often late with votes in certain cases and rarely read briefs or records prior
to oral argument, Burger often found time to spend two hours in Justice
Powell's office, interruptions which Powell found annoying. As successor to
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Burger evidently felt the need to assert leadership.
As a result, he attempted to assign as many unanimous cases to himself as
possible. and sought to enforce uniformity in even the type of chair used by the
Justices during oral argument. Reacting to the Watergate controversy, Burger
is quoted as saying, " 'Apart from the morality ... I don't see what they did
wrong.' "6
If the view is jaundiced, however, it may well be due to the source of the
material upon which it is based rather than to the authors. Woodward and
Armstrong take pains to avoid any direct judgmental assessment and merely
set down the evidence provided them, evidence marshalled, to be sure, according to the authors' will. Indeed, the book lists several positive attributes such as
Burger's kindness to Justice William Douglas following his stroke; Burger's
cleverness in putting his thoughts into a concurrence, rather than into a dissent, to increase their influence; his administrative ability in dealing with many
needed improvements at the Court; and his proposal, despite his own conservatism, to President Nixon that Judge Frank Johnson of Alabama, a liberal
with a strong civil rights record, be appointed to the Court. Ironically, rather
than making the portrayal a favorable one, these positive matters only make
the more numerous negative matters more credible. 7
Despite the strong suggestion of his manipulation and intellectual
dishonesty, perhaps the most pervasive characteristic of the Chief Justice
discernible in The Brethren is a lack of judicial temperament. Justice Burger
seems to have neither the mind nor the personality called for in any independent judicial person. His inordinate fear of being alone in dissent reflects this.
Burger emerges as more political than judicial, one who might be more comfortable as a Congressional leader than as Chief Justice.
"5

JUSTICE WILLIAM DOUGLAS
Douglas is pictured as the Court maverick, ferocious in both his defense of
5 Id. at 133.
6 Id. at 287.
7 The credibility is also increased by the fact that previous ChiefJustice Earl Warren himself does not
emerge untarnished.
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civil rights and in his relationship with the clerks. Douglas refers to Burger as
"this Chief' to distinguish him from Earl Warren ("the Chief"). Douglas informs his clerks that he was suicidal when Nixon informed Douglas that it was
his speech at Duke Law School that inspired Nixon's political career. Nixon
later had Douglas investigated in an attempt to oust Douglas in favor of a Nixon appointee. Unquestionably bright, Douglas is reported to have been "so
prolific that once when former Justice Charles E. Whittaker was unable to
draft a majority opinion, Douglas finished his dissent and then wrote Whittaker's majority for him." 8 Douglas can be humorous. When asked, following
his stroke, how he could participate in the Court's business although unable to
read, Douglas shot back, "I'll listen and see how the Chief votes and vote the
other way." 9 Nevertheless, the book's most poignant nmoments involve
Douglas's stroke, his retirement from the Court and his sad attempt to remain
a full member of the Court even after his retirement.
JUSTICE WILLIAM BRENNAN
Brennan is drawn as a gentle person and civil libertarian of the first order
who, nonetheless, fires an activist clerk whose hiring had become a public
issue. Although known for his pronouncements in the free speech area, he is
pictured as sexually naive and paranoid about the press. After a triumphant
period on the Warren Court, Brennan became increasingly forced into a
dissenting and isolated posture on the Burger Court. His frustration led to increasingly bitter opinions that, because of their bitterness, tended to be
counterproductive.
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
The Brethren portrays him as the least productive member of the Court
who, nonetheless, gets brilliant work out of his clerks. Marshall apparently
delights in making Burger uncomfortable, sometimes greeting him with
"what's shakin', Chiefy baby?"' 1 despite the suggestion that Burger "genuinely likes" Marshall."
JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST
Called "Renchburg" by President Nixon, who had difficulty remembering his name, Rehnquist brings cold logic to his task but emerges, many
readers will be surprised to learn, as the most likeable member of the Court.
Rehnquist is pictured as affable to all Court personnel, calling even the lowliest
by name. Much of any sense of humor reflected among Court members
belongs to Rehnquist, who chuckles at an extreme example of Burger's formality, brings a sexually explicit National Lampoon cartoon about the Court to
8
9
10
11

B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 63.
Id. at 391. He was presumably referring to Burger despite the use of the phrase "the Chief."
Id. at 59.
Id.
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the conference room and even dares to-attend a conference in a "Court softball
2
team T-shirt."'
The authors justify their foray into the internal doings of the Court by
noting that the Court, unlike Congress and the President, is not subject to the
electoral process and has generally escaped public scrutiny. 13 This justification
itself deserves some scrutiny. The public has no electoral power over the
Court's membership except in the election of the appointing President and the
confirming Senate. On the other hand, perhaps no other part of the government is as publicly accountable as is the Court since every significant "input"
to the Court-i.e., the briefs and oral arguments-is available to the public.
Furthermore, the Court's actions are embodied in its opinions and other decisions which are fully exposed to public scrutiny. Although the Court's decisionmaking process is not routinely exposed to public view, almost total accountability is provided by the public's knowing which cases and arguments are put
4
before the Court and precisely how the Court dealt with each one.1
The picture painted by the authors of the Court's internal workings will
leave many people shocked by some of the pettiness, bitterness and even crudity displayed by the justices and others. Perhaps, however, this de-mystification
of the Court will serve a salutary purpose. The Court's personnel are, after all,
human beings. It is naive to assume that justices spend twenty-four hours a
day in black robes, intoning such phrases as "all deliberate speed," "prior
restraint" and "de minimis." It should come as no shock that these people,
dealing with society's most important, emotional and controversial issues,
should on occasion get angry, bitter or frustrated. Perhaps it would be more
disappointing to learn that such issues are discussed and decided in total calm
and detachment, pursuant solely to logic and precedent. Although, ideally, the
aggressive give-and-take between Justices would occur without their losing
respect for each other, The Brethren impresses upon the reader the fact that
despite their surprisingly human foibles, the Justices care deeply about the
matters brought before them. It is reassuring to read, for example, thatJustices
Stewart and Powell literally lost sleep over the death penalty cases; 5 that
countless hours of additional work are done exploring the implications of cases,
despite the fact that decision could be based solely on the material provided by
the parties; that Justice Powell insisted on hiring liberal clerks to keep his
natural conservatism honest; and that even Justices Douglas and Burger could
become allies as required by certain issues. Ultimately, it is evident that much
of the bitterness and friction among the Justices results from the intensity of
feelings and the diversity of perspectives brought to each issue. For example, at
one point Brennan complains that Rehnquist "often twist[s] the meaning of
prior cases, or baldly ignore[s] them when they support the other side.' '16 On
12 Id. at 413.
13 Id. at 1.
14 The least is known, perhaps, about the reasons for denials of certiorari petitions, but the effective decision in such cases is made not by the United States Supreme Court but by the Court from which the case
came.
15 The authors report that the day the Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty Marshall,
"[d]rained and discouraged.., went home early. That night he had a mild heart attack." B. WOODWARD &
S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 441.
16 Id. at 405.
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another occasion, Rehnquist complains of Brennan's bending of the facts or
17
law for his own ends.
Significantly, despite the thorough examination given the Court in connection with the publication of The Brethren, no dramatic incident of corruption
or other influence is even suggested. On the occasions when outsiders made inappropriate attempts to influence a Justice, the outsiders were quickly sent
away. Furthermore, the members of the Court have consistently removed
themselves from cases in which their participation might create even the appearance of conflict of interest.
The Brethren does suggest areas of serious concern. The extent to which exchange among the Justices takes place on paper rather than in conference is
surprising. At one point, Justice Stevens is pictured as concerned "that the
Justices communicate[d] only on paper; there [is] not enough informal discussion." ' Apparently, the conference is more a forum for voting and stating
positions than for arguing issues. This is not to say that the memorandum
method of decision is inadequate. It is perhaps superior in providing time for
reflection. Although the Justices use the parties' oral argument for speaking to
each other through questions and observations put to counsel, more intensive
oral debate of the delicate issues facing the Court might be valuable.
The Brethren also underlines the need for a Constitutional amendment
mandating retirement at a certain age. The argument that many good things
have been done by Justices at a very advanced age is not persuasive. Such good
things are at least as likely to come from younger (under seventy, for example)
Justices.
The effect of young law clerks on the Court's decision-making process
may be a revelation to some readers. Clerks have an obvious impact on the
Justice for whom they work. Further, clerks influence other Justices indirectly
through exchanges with their clerks. To some extent, in fact, the Court is like a
federation of nine discrete units, each made up of one Justice and his entourage. The clerks serve as emissaries to the other units, exchanging views,
negotiating, forming coalitions and the like. Often, of course, two or more
Justices themselves meet, in what could be called summit meetings. In any
event, the enormously bright young men and women who serve as clerks clearly bring an intellectual contribution to the Court that is substantial. Individual
Justices can, moreover, be relied upon to temper any potential abuse of power
on the clerkship level. Since an individual Justice's and the Court's work is
known generally through opinions signed by individual Justices, professional
pride on the part of both individual Justices and the Court as a whole provides
a continuing incentive to prevent any potential abuse of power on the clerkship
level.
Perhaps the gravest threat posed by The Brethren sensationalism is that it
may distract from the most valuable contribution made by the book, namely,
its laborious and detailed account of the decision-making process. The authors
avoid giving any personal analysis of or judgment on either the merits of the
cases or the methodology of their resolution. The decision-making process is
17
18

Id. at 411.
Id. at 429.
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rendered through the memoranda, thoughts, and observations of the participants. The reader, like the viewer at cinema-verite, is allowed to draw his own
conclusions. Cases on racial desegregation, the death penalty, the Nixon tapes
and many others are revealed precisely through the collection of detail.
Although nonlawyers as well as many lawyers may occasionally find the going
tiresome, the result is a fascinating account of decision-making at the highest
level.
A major benefit of The Brethren for the nonlawyer is the effective description, in nontechnical language, of various Court decisions. For example, in
describing Harris v. New York, 19 in which the Court held that statements
secured from an individual in violation of his Miranda rights, 20 at least if not
otherwise coerced, could be used as impeachment evidence though not in the
government's case-in-chief, the authors state eloquently:
In the pending case, a lower court had made an exception to the strict commands of Miranda when the defendant, in testifying at his trial, had contradicted what he had first told police. The prosecutor claimed that the earlier
statements had2to
be admitted in court in order to challenge the defendant's
1
new testimony.
Other difficult cases, such as Mapp v. Ohio, 22 are also well explained in
layman's language.
Although not ideal, the book's organization is serviceable. Following an
Introduction and Prologue, the book'discusses seven consecutive Terms of
Court, beginning with the 1969 Term (Burger's first), in seven consecutive
chapters. Some disjointedness and repetition might have been avoided by more
cross-Term discussion. The writing is fast-moving and interesting, although
occasionally the language is confusing, awkward or sloppy. These occasional
lapses are more than offset by effective description of a difficult and complex
process.
In conclusion, the United States Supreme Court will survive The
Brethren. 23 Indeed, much of the book reinforces the positive image of the Court
cherished by the American public. The book may have some impact in the
short run on the extent to which clerks are taken into the Justices' confidence.
Ultimately and inevitably, however, the Justices and their clerks will resume
trusting one another to the extent permissible within the limits of their individual personalities. Ironically, there is no guarantee that distrust and excessive caution on the part of Justices in their relations with their clerks will
preclude the type of unflattering exposure provided by The Brethren.
Significantly, Justice Burger, apparently the most distrustful and cautious of
the Justices, was accorded The Brethren's harshest treatment. Indeed, that very
distrust and caution may have caused some of the "leaks."
Even if some restraint among participants in the Supreme Court process
19 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
20 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21 B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 113.
22 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23 As it will survive the forthcoming memoirs of Mr. Justice Douglas, which may well provide a still
harsher and more authoritative jolt. See TIME, Mar. 10, 1980, at 48.
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ensues, the effectiveness of that process should not be significantly impaired,
since the most embarrassing disclosures in the book are unrelated to statements
or events vital to the process of deciding cases. If The Brethren causes a Justice to
forego using harsh epithets about another Justice before a clerk or if The
Brethren prevents ajustice from sitting in another Justice's office~wasting time,
little has been lost.
In the final analysis, the most serious harm has been done to the individuals involved. Much of the book's sensationalism was not vital to a
description of the Court's decision-making process. Some statements, evidently taken out of context, put the speaker in a worse light than the original context might have warranted. Many of the sensational items in the book should
have been subjected to a balancing test, weighing the item's public importance
against potential harm to individuals. For example, when one of the Justices
takes a certain action because of the personal problem of a member of his family, it was unnecessary to name the specific problem. The family member is not
a public servant and did not sign on for public exposure. Even some items involving public figures would have been excised had the authors shown more
sensitivity. In this regard The Brethren often tells us more about the authors than
it tells us about the Court.
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